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1 
The principle of Subsidiarity and the new proposed Protocol 
 
1. Introduction 
The debate over the principle of subsidiarity is a debate of a constitutional nature which reflects 
concerns over the way Community competence is exercised, together with wider worries for the 
lack of accountability in the law-making process. There is a wide-spread feeling that the Union 
lacks an efficient monitoring procedure to ensure compliance with the principle, which is left to the 
goodwill of the European institutions and to the, somehow deficient, scrutiny of national 
Parliaments under domestic constitutional arrangements. For this reason, the mandate to Working 
Group I on subsidiarity, identified as the main area for investigation the possibility of creating new 
monitoring procedures. Acknowledging that the principle is mainly political, the mandate referred 
to various possible non-judicial mechanisms to ensure compliance with the principle: the creation of 
a Mr/Ms Subsidiarity entrusted with the task; the possibility of involving national Parliaments either 
by including them in the legislative procedure (such as allowing representatives of national 
Parliaments to sit in Council); or by enhancing control of the positions taken by the Governments; 
the possibility of creating a new ad hoc body entrusted with monitoring the compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. The mandate also referred to the possibility of enhancing judicial scrutiny 
identifying several possible solutions, such as the creation of a subsidiarity chamber in the ECJ; the 
setting up of a form of co-operation between the ECJ and national Constitutional Courts; the 
broadening of the jurisdiction of the Court so as to provide scrutiny also over Title V and VI of the 
EU Treaty (Second and Third Pillar); the possibility of providing an ex-ante judicial scrutiny; the 
amendment of Article 230 EC so as to grant standing to national Parliaments; or to the ad hoc body 
should this be set up; and to the Committee of the Regions. The Working Group has now produced 
a Draft of the Protocol on Subsidiairty and Proportionality. The main innovation proposed by the 
Working Group relates to a new procedure granting national Parliaments the possibility to lodge 
reasoned opinions on compliance of proposed legislation with the principle of subsidiarity.  
This paper will first analyse the existing situation, to then turn to consider the system proposed by 
the Working Group.  
  
2. The origin of the principle 
The principle of subsidiarity was first established in the Single European Act in relation to the 
exercise of Community competence in environmental matters.
1
 In 1992, it was introduced as a 
                                                 
1
 The literature on subsidiarity is copious. See e.g. G. De Burca “Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after 
Amsterdam”, Jean Monnet Paper, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.html; and “The principle of 
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2 
general principle in Article 5 EC Treaty (ex Article 3b), which provides that in areas of non-
exclusive competence the “Community shall take action, (…), only if and insofar as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effect of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. Article 
5 spells also out the principle of proportionality according to which “Any action by the Community 
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve” the Treaty objectives.  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a Protocol on the application of the principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality;
2
 this provides inter alia that: 
- proposed legislation should contain reasons to justify its compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality and be substantiated by qualitative and where possible 
quantitative criteria;  
- the Commission shall justify its proposals with regard to the principle of subsidiarity;  
- the Commission shall submit an annual report on the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity.   
 
There is widely felt scepticism on whether the principle of subsidiarity has had a real impact on the 
law-making practice of the Community. If the Commission is entrusted with justifying its proposals 
according to the principle, and members of Council should monitor that the Commission’s 
proposals actually comply with it, this is often not the case. 
 
3. Subsidiarity and the Commission 
In its yearly reports, the Commission is eager to stress how the number of proposals for legislation 
put forward has significantly decreased in the last ten years (from 797 in 1990, to 316 in 2002). 
However, the Commission itself admits that the figures might be misleading in that they also reflect 
the fact that the “Community has reached a stage of maturity with regard to the objectives of the 
Treaty and the existing acquis”.3 In other words, the decrease in legislative proposals is also the 
result of greater achieved integration, and not just the result of the introduction of the principle of 
subsidiarity. This said, the decrease is so significant that it might well be that the introduction of the 
principle of subsidiarity has determined some self-restraint on the part of the institutions. This 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an institutional actor” (1998) Journal of Common Market Studies 217-235; N. 
MacKormick “Problems of Democracy and Subsidiarity” (2000) EPL 531-542.   
2
 The Protocol substantially codifies the approach taken at the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992, (1992) 
OJ C 337, 116.  
3
 Report from the Commission “Better Lawmaking 2002” COM(2002) 715 final, point 3.1. See also previous reports all 
available on www.europa.eu.int. See also the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428 
final.     
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3 
notwithstanding, once there is a political will to act, compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
seems more questionable, and scepticism seems to be more than justified. Few, by no-mean 
exhaustive, examples might illustrate the point. Council Directive on the “keeping of wild animals 
in zoos” is in this respect a good demonstration of how the principle of subsidiarity, once there is a 
will to regulate, might be little more than a cosmetic principle.
4
 The Preamble to the directive states 
that “The proper implementation of existing and future Community legislation on the conservation 
of wild fauna and the need to ensure that zoos adequately fulfil their important role in the 
conservation of species, public education, and/or scientific research make it necessary to provide a 
common basis for Member States’ legislation with regard to the licensing and inspection of zoos, 
the keeping of animals in zoos, the training of staff and the education of the visiting public” and that 
“action at Community level is required in order to have zoos throughout the Community 
contributing to the conservation of biodiversity in accordance with the Community’s obligation to 
adopt measures for ex situ conservation” according to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The 
text of the Directive does not suggest there to be any cross-border issue which would be better dealt 
at Community level: indeed the only possibility of cross-bordering seems to arise from the danger 
that animals could escape from zoos.
5
 Of course this directive regulates an area which would not 
raise much concern amongst public opinion or national Parliaments as to a possible loss of 
regulatory competence and state sovereignty. The same cannot be said of two recent proposals for 
directives which touch upon criminal and civil law proceedings: the proposed directives on 
compensation to crime victims,
6
 and on legal aid.
 7
 The explanatory memorandum to the former, in 
assessing the need for Community harmonising rules, states that disparities in national legislation 
concerning compensation for crime “can only appear arbitrary from the perspective of the citizen. 
Such unfair and arbitrary effects are not compatible with establishing the EU as an area of freedom, 
security and justice for all.” As for the explicit assessment of subsidiarity, the Commission just 
refers to the quoted section to state that there is clearly a Community dimension to the problem and 
that: “The necessary approximation of the laws of the Member States and the mechanisms needed 
for cross-border situations can be better achieved by the Community than by the Member States 
acting alone and will thereby provide an added value”.8 It is rather surprising that this is all the 
                                                 
4
 Council Directive 1999/22/EC of 19 March 1999, relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos, OJ L 94/1999, p. 24-
26.  
5
 See also Directive 98/6/EC of 16 March 1998, on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products 
offered to consumers, OJ L 80/1998 p. 27-30, which applies also to purely static consumer transactions. 
6
 Proposal for a Council Directive on compensation to crime victims, COM(2002) 562 final. 
7
 Proposal for a Council Directive to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum 
common rules to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil proceedings, COM (2002) 13 final. 
8
 Section 5.3 of the explanatory memorandum. 
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4 
justification needed for a measure for which the Treaty does not provide an express legal basis (the 
Directive is to be adopted under Article 308 EC).  
The assessment of subsidiarity is similarly disappointing for the proposed Directive on legal aid,
9
 
which provides for a general right to legal aid for people without sufficient resources. The 
explanatory memorandum to the Directive states that “The measure aims to establish cooperation 
procedures between Member States and to approximate certain national provisions by establishing 
common minimum standards.” It then continues “as these objectives cannot be achieved by the 
Member States acting alone, it requires action at Community level”.  
The fact that such important pieces of legislation should provide such a concise, if not altogether 
circular assessment of the need for Community action, might well explain why the Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality Protocol has been considered ripe for change. Further, the scrutiny operated by 
Council might not prove very effective: sometimes underlying national political tensions might 
make it easier for governments to act at European rather than national level.  
 
4. The principle of subsidiarity in the case law of the European Court of Justice 
If “political” monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity might be considered at present ineffective, 
judicial monitoring is even more difficult. It is recognised that questions relating to the level at 
which regulation should be adopted are mainly of a political nature, and the European Court of 
Justice might find it difficult to adjudicate on the matter. Indeed, the Court has so far refrained from 
taking an interventionist stance in monitoring compliance of legislation with the principle of 
subsidiairity.  
In the working time directive case,
10
 the UK argued that a measure could be considered 
proportionate only if it also complied with the principle of subsidiarity, and that it was for the 
Community legislature to demonstrate that the aim pursued by the Directive could be better 
achieved at Community level. The Court held that since Council had found that there was a need to 
harmonise then it meant that there was need for Community action.  
In the deposit guarantees case,
11
 Germany brought a challenge to the deposit guarantee directive 
arguing inter alia that the Community legislature had failed to give reasons according to Article 253 
(ex Article 190) in relation to the subsidiarity principle, i.e. it had failed to state the need for 
Community action.
12
 The Court dismissed the claim by holding that the preamble to the Directive 
stated that it was “indispensable to ensure a harmonised minimum level of deposit protection” and 
                                                 
9
 Proposal for a Council Directive to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum 
common rules to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil proceedings, COM (2002) 13 final. 
10
 C-84/94 UK v Council (Working Time) [1996] ECR I-5755, para 47 and 55. 
11
 C-233/94 Germany v Council (Deposit Guarantees) [1997] ECR I-2405, para 26. 
12
 The Protocol had not been enacted at the time.  
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5 
that thus in the legislature’s view action at Community level was needed. The Court again seemed 
reluctant to render the subsidiarity principle justiciable, albeit in this case Germany was arguing not 
that the measure per se failed to comply with the principle but rather that it failed to state the 
necessity of Community action.  
In the biotechnology directive case,
13
 the Court found that even though the Preamble to the directive 
was silent as to the matter, compliance with the principle of subsidiarity was “implicit” in the 
recitals which dealt with the need to harmonise.  
 
Also, some confusion as to the possible scope of the principle of subsidiarity has been created by 
the fact that the principle only applies to areas of non-exclusive competence of the Community. In 
this respect some Advocates General have argued that competence in relation to the internal market 
is exclusive and thus the principle of subsidiarity does not apply.
14
 In the second tobacco 
advertising case,
15
 the Court, consistently with the approach now endorsed by the Convention,
16
 
clarified that the principle of subsidiarity applies also to the internal market. It should, however, be 
borne in mind that since internal market competence can be exercised only to eliminate obstacles to 
movement or appreciable distortions of competition, if there is competence, then almost 
automatically Community action is going to be more effective than action at national level. In 
internal market cases then subsidiarity might be relevant, if at all, in assessing whether single 
provisions of the relevant instrument comply with the need to legislate as closely as possible to the 
citizen, rather than to assess the need to legislate at Community level. 
Furthermore, even in cases which do not relate to the internal market, the Court might well be 
unwilling to interfere with political choices if there is no issue about competence. In relation to 
proportionality, a principle which is considered more readily justiciable, the Court has adopted a 
non-interventionist approach.
17
 Thus though in principle subsidiarity might be a justiciable issue, in 
practice there is an understandable reticence of the Court in substituting its own judgement for that 
of the institutions, in assessing a choice which is ultimately perceived as political.  
 
                                                 
13
 C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council (Biotechnology) [2002] ECR I-6229, opinion para 75-84. Ruling 
para 30-34. 
14
 Cf AG Léger in C-233/94 Germany v Council (Deposit Guarantees) [1997] ECR I-2405, opinion para 90; AG Jacobs 
in C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council (Biotechnology), opinion para 75-84; AG Fenelly in C-376/98 
Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising) [2000] ECR I-2247, opinion para 132-145. 
15
 C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco ltd, 
ruling of 10/12/02. Opinion para 285-287, ruling para 174-185. 
16
 But the as it stando at present the text of the draft Constitution is unclear. See M. Dougan in this contribution, p..   
17
 C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973. N. Reich “Judge made ‘Europe à la carte’: Some Remarks on 
Recent Conflicts between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation” (1996) EJIL 
103-111.  
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5. The role of national Parliaments in the existing system 
At present those who deny the existence of a democratic deficit in the Community, also rely on the 
fact that the members of Council are directly accountable to national Parliaments under national 
constitutional arrangements. This said, it is broadly recognised that the scrutiny of national 
Parliaments is deficient, partially because of the very process of Community legislating, but also 
because of time and interest. In attempting to render the scrutiny of national Parliaments more 
effective, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a Protocol on the role of National Parliaments. This 
provides that all Commission consultation documents have to be “promptly” forwarded to the 
national Parliaments; that Commission proposals for legislation “shall be made available in good 
time”; and that, except for cases of urgency, a minimum of six weeks must elapse between when the 
proposal is made available to the EU institutions, and when it is placed on the Council’s agenda. 
Further, the Protocol also provides that the Conference of European Affairs Committees 
(COSAC)
18
 might make any contribution it deems appropriate to draft legislation, including 
initiatives and proposals made under the third pillar when those affect individuals’ rights and 
freedoms. Also, COSAC might address the institutions in relation to subsidiarity and fundamental 
rights.  
The monitoring of European legislation is thus primarily left to national constitutional 
arrangements, and it is felt as not being particularly effective. 
 
6. The proposed Protocol 
Having regard to the existing situation of unsatisfactory political monitoring, and difficult judicial 
scrutiny, the Working Group proposed a new system whereby national Parliaments would acquire a 
formal role in monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
19
 Thus, the powers of 
scrutiny of national Parliaments would be significantly enhanced both through a redefinition of the 
Commission’s obligations and through the establishment of a formal monitoring procedure. 
 
In the proposed Protocol, the principle of subsidiarity is spelled out in a considerably less detailed 
fashion than in the existing one. Thus, paragraph 1 provides that “Each institution shall ensure 
                                                 
18
 COSAC was established in 1989 and consists of representative of the relevant committees in the national Parliaments 
and of members of the European Parliament. At present it meets every six months. 
19
 On the debate building up to the Convention see the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
“Report on the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States” (so called Lamassoure 
Report), FINAL A5-0133/2002. See also the “Mandate of the Working Group on the principle of subsidiarity”, CONV 
71/02.  
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7 
constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality” (emphasis added)  (…). The 
references to maintaining the acquis, to the powers conferred to the Community and to the dynamic 
nature of the principle of subsidiarity have been deleted. The commentary states that this “reduced” 
and “simplified” version has been adopted in order to make it “compatible” with the nature of a 
Protocol annexed to the Constitution. It is unlikely that these changes will have any “legal” impact: 
however, they highlight a certain political reticence in stressing that some principles are not affected 
by the principle of subsidiarity.  Further the amended language seems to suggest that the institutions 
are under a duty to continue vigilance (and not only in relation to their own actions): it is not clear if 
this would translate in a duty to repeal legislation should, because of changes in circumstances, it 
cease to comply with the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Paragraph 2 provides that, except in cases of urgency or confidentiality, the Commission shall 
consult widely. It also states the duty, where appropriate, to take into account the “regional and 
local” dimension of the envisaged action, which is not spelled out in the existing Protocol. 
 
Paragraph 3 introduces an obligation for the Commission to send its proposals to national 
Parliaments at the same time as to the Union legislator (in the existing Protocol they must be sent 
“as soon as possible” and “promptly”). It also places an obligation on the European Parliament and 
Council to send resolutions and common positions as soon as they are adopted.  
 
Paragraph 4, introduces the duty for the Commission to attach a “subsidiarity sheet” to the proposed 
legislation and it details the issues which should be addressed in the assessment (such as financial 
implications but also implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States, and where 
necessary the regional dimension). As said above, the Court has so far not considered the lack of an 
“explicit” subsidiarity assessment as an essential procedural requirement capable of affecting the 
legality of the measure under attack. It is not clear whether the more detailed obligation placed upon 
the Commission by the proposed Protocol will have any bearing on the Court’s approach.   
 
Following the date on which the proposed legislation is received, National Parliaments would have 
six weeks to lodge a reasoned opinion. It is left to the national Parliaments to make the internal 
arrangements for bicameral Parliaments. Thus it would be for each Parliament to decide whether the 
reasoned opinion could be adopted separately by each chamber.  The proposed amendments to the 
Protocol suggest that each Parliament should be given two votes so that those systems which do not 
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8 
have bicameral Parliaments would carry the same weight as those which have bicameral 
Parliaments. 
The Protocol then provides that European Parliament, Council and Commission should take account 
of the National Parliaments’ reasoned opinions. This would probably mean that failure to comply 
with the six weeks standstill provision could constitute a breach of an “essential procedural” 
requirement.
20
 It is not clear whether grounds of urgency might justify a derogation. Paragraph 5, 
unlike paragraph 2 on the Commission’s duty to consult, does not refer to such possibility. 
However, paragraph 4 of the proposed Protocol on the role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union provides that the six weeks period might be derogated from on grounds “of extreme urgency, 
the reasons for which shall be stated in the act or common position”.21 It is to be hoped that this 
discrepancy between the two texts is going to be remedied in the final draft.  
 
If one third of national Parliaments lodge reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of the proposal 
with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission is under a duty to review its proposal (this seems 
to be an essential procedural requirement), but it can maintain it nonetheless. The Protocol also 
places upon the Commission a duty to give reasons (also this should be an essential procedural 
requirement). Further, national Parliaments might lodge a reasoned opinion also in the period 
between the date in which the conciliation meeting under the co-decision procedure is convened and 
the date in which the meeting actually takes place. European Parliament and Council shall take the 
“fullest” account of the opinions expressed by national Parliaments. As the text stands at present, 
there is no duty for the European Parliament and the Council to reconsider, should 1/3 of national 
Parliaments lodge an opinion at this stage. This is peculiar having regard to the fact that at 
conciliation stage the proposed legislation might have incurred substantive amendments: it has thus 
been suggested to either eliminate the possibility of lodging reasoned opinion at this stage, or to 
make it consistent with the rest of the Protocol by imposing a duty on the institutions to reconsider 
should the 1/3 threshold be met.  
 
Paragraph 6 and 7 constitute the truly innovative part of the Protocol, in that for the first time 
national Parliaments acquire a “formal” role in the law-making procedure, even though the idea that 
national Parliaments could be involved as co-legislators, either by being represented in Council or 
through a separate chamber, has been rejected. And so far also the idea of granting national 
parliaments a “veto” power (so called red-card model) has been discarded.  
                                                 
20
 Cf Case 138/79 Roquette Frères SA v Council [1980] ECR 3333. 
21
 Draft Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, (CONV 579/03) para 4. In the existing 
protocol the six weeks stand-still provision can be derogated from on grounds of “urgency”.  
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9 
The proposed model thus clearly seeks to strike a balance between the political aim to ensure a 
more effective scrutiny of the way Union competence is exercised and the practical will not to 
further burden and delay the already complex law making process. However, the protocol raises a 
number of questions of different nature (political, practical but also legal).  
The Community legislative procedure is characterised by the need to balance democratic 
representation and regional state representation; thus the weighting of the votes in Council and the 
move towards qualified majority voting which is aimed at ensuring that one country does not hold 
the legislative process at a ransom. The figure of 1/3 of Parliaments is in this respect rather low. It 
would allow for a number of countries significantly below the threshold needed to block legislation, 
to delay the legislative process. It is true that as the proposal stands at present, this is only a 
“yellow” card, i.e. it does not grant national Parliaments, as some wish, the power to block 
legislation. However, if the Commission is to take seriously its obligation to reconsider and to give 
reasons for its decisions, the new procedure might significantly delay a legislative process already 
characterised by its geological timing.  
Secondly, it is not clear whether in order to be counted towards the “1/3” threshold, the reasoned 
opinions would have to raise the same, or similar, issues, or whether it is enough for Parliaments to 
have lodged an opinion raising doubts as to compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. If the 
latter were the case, national Parliaments might well be encouraged just to lodge “pre-emptive” 
opinions (also given the fact that the 6 weeks time limit is quite tight). If however the former would 
be the case, as it has been proposed in the amendments, then there would be a problem as to who 
would assess the “similarity” of the issues. If it were to be the Commission, then there would be a 
clear conflict of interest. And surely, it would be unwise to involve the Court at such an early stage 
of the legislative process. 
Thirdly, the representations of the interests of the regions is left to the good will of national 
arrangements. This is all well and fine for those Member States where regions are represented in 
one of the chambers. It is less so in cases where the devolution process has not produced a chamber 
representative of regional powers.  
Other issues which should be considered are practical and political. From a practical viewpoint the 
six weeks deadline is very tight, and national Parliaments might well prove not to manage an 
efficient monitoring role together with their heavy schedule. Another practical issue concerns the 
difficulty of co-ordination between the various national Parliaments, especially if COSAC keeps on 
meeting only every six months as it does now. 
From a political perspective, there is a risk that national Parliaments be tempted to lodge an opinion 
not because of subsidiarity, but because of objections to the substantive provisions of the 
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10 
legislation. Take the internal market example: it seems that once competence to legislate is 
established, then subsidiarity cannot play a significant role. This is because if there is a cross-border 
barrier or a distortion of competition, then almost automatically the Community is in a better 
position to legislate. However, opposition to internal market legislation might derive from a choice 
over competing values which rejects the idea that economic, or social as the case might be, values 
should take precedence. This issue, which might well reflect some popular concerns about the way 
the Community exercises its competence, would not be of relevance in relation to subsidiarity.  
The other risk, which again reflects important legitimacy issues, is of course that European 
legislation be affected by national political dynamics.   
 
Judicial Review 
The idea of a preliminary scrutiny by the European Court over compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity has been rejected, probably because of concerns over excessively delaying the law-
making procedure; and because of the fact that political scrutiny is to be preferred to judicial 
scrutiny. This said, the Protocol also refers to possibility of judicial review. 
In this respect it had been originally proposed to accord locus standi to national Parliaments in front 
of the ECJ: after all if Community competence has been wrongly exercised it affects their 
prerogatives. The proposed Protocol, however, simply states that “Member States, where 
appropriate at the request of the national Parliaments,” might bring proceedings. This is, however, 
already the case since under Article 230 Member States are privileged applicants, and whether the 
Government must act should the national Parliament so requests, is, and remains, a matter for 
national law.  
The reason why locus standi has not been directly vested upon national Parliaments is out of the 
fear that to do so would undermine the unity of national systems. However, it is unclear why the 
fear of undermining the unity of the system come into consideration only in relation to locus standi, 
and not in relation to the possibility to lodge reasoned opinions. After all, the system of reasoned 
opinions seems designed to overcome a failure of accountability of ministers in Council. Thus if 
pragmatism has won in the first part of the Protocol, by acknowledging that Parliaments and 
Governments might have differing views which might not be effectively voiced in the present 
system (it is unlikely that a Government would loose the confidence of its Parliament over a 
subsidiarity issue), then why is that not the case in relation to review of legislation? The 
unwillingness to give any tangible powers to national Parliaments thus shows the main shortcoming 
of the Protocol, which seems designed to merely give a cosmetic role to national Parliaments.   
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Further, the proposed Protocol provides that the Committee of the Regions acquire standing to bring 
Article 230 proceedings, albeit only in regard to those acts on which it was consulted. Under the 
present arrangements Commission and Council have a duty to consult the Committee of the 
Regions in the following areas: economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure 
networks, health, education and culture, employment policy, social policy, the environment, 
vocational training and transport. 
 
 
Amendments suggested by the Convention to the proposed Protocol. 
The most important amendments proposed the Convention concern the inclusion of a scrutiny over 
compliance with the principle of proportionality and the possibility to grant a veto power to national 
Parliaments.
22
 As for inclusion of the principle of proportionality: it should be considered that in 
this case national parliaments would have a say over substantive issues, i.e. whether the proposed 
legislation strikes the right balance between competing interests. This depending on the views might 
be a good or a bad thing. But surely it would change the nature of the scrutiny: proportionality is a 
more readily justiciable issue than subsidiarity.   
As for the introduction of a “red card” procedure: according to this view, if 2/3 of national 
Parliaments lodged a reasoned opinion the Commission would be under an obligation to, according 
to the views, either withdraw the proposed piece of legislation or to modify it.
23
  Under the 
Presidium’s proposal qualified majority voting should be substituted by a vote which reflected a 
single majority of the Member States, representing at least 3/5 of the population. In a Union of 25 
with several small and medium Member States, to allow 2/3 of the national Parliaments a veto 
power, would mean to allow a number of countries representing a population significantly below 
the threshold needed to block legislation in Council (under the Presidium’s Draft), to stop 
legislation from being enacted. Further, the idea that national Parliaments are vested with a veto 
power, poses national constitutional problems, in that it would create and highlight a real fracture 
between Governments and their Parliaments which would have to rely upon Community law in 
order to ensure that their representatives in Council do not act against their wishes. If the unity of 
the State is threaten by the possibility of Parliament having locus standi, what would the power to 
block legislation do to traditional ideas of democracy and accountability within Member States? 
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Further, in the case the problems relating to who is to assess the similarity of the lodged opinions, if 
indeed such similarity were to be required, would become of paramount importance.   
 
7. Concluding remarks 
It is no secret that sometimes European law has been used to bypass political impasses at national 
level, and it is no secret that sometimes European law is unnecessary, if not altogether silly. This 
said, it is to be wondered whether the proposed protocol would have any effect but to further delay 
the law-making procedure. It is not obvious that such a system would ultimately result in better law-
making: institutions have a tendency to enjoy stating their powers against other political 
institutions. 
The debate over subsidiarity is ultimately a political one which betrays not only a distrust over the 
way Community legislation is enacted, but also a distrust over the traditional working of national 
governments. It is interesting that, as it often happens in the European political process, the debate 
concentrates on the former rather than on the latter. The fact that lack of ministerial accountability 
in relation to European matters is better dealt at European level rather than at national level is 
ironic: it seems to conflict with the very principle of subsidiarity that the Protocol is aiming at re-
affirming.  
Further, entrusting national Parliaments with a formal role at European level, might reinforce the 
citizens’ perception that their interests are represented by their national, rather than by the 
European, Parliament. 
 
The introduction of a general principle of subsidiarity in 1992 and 1997 has failed to produce 
tangible results: where there is a political will to act there is a way. It remains to be seen whether 
the new procedure will deliver. The suspicion remains however, that this might end up being just a 
“tabloid” friendly way of approaching a serious problem (see e.g the use of hyperbolic language 
such as the institutions should take the “fullest” account, the meaningless provision on judicial 
review, and ultimately the fact that National Parliaments have been given but a ‘cosmetic’ power), 
rather than an effective and thought-through way to tackle complex issues such as the transparency 
and legitimacy of the European law-making process.
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